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 The First World War (1914–1918) had become the most modern and costliest conflict in 
the history of Europe and its colonies at the time of the armistice in 1918. New and improved 
weapons were coupled with an intense nationalistic mobilization of all resources available to the 
state. This combination forced all modern militaries to push the limits of what was 
conventionally considered relevant or useful to a war effort in order to gain the advantage over 
their rival. For instance, with a degree of research and development, industrialized chemical 
production processes could be altered to produce mass quantities of poison gas, the air could be 
used as a platform for reconnaissance or bombing, and the weather could be monitored and 
forecasted to aid in the efficient operation of an entire war machine. While the spread of air 
combat operations and the use of chemicals in warfare are well studied threads in the history of 
the First World War, meteorological science and its practice on this modernized battlefield has 
largely been neglected by modern scholars. 
 The United States joined the war in April 1917 and many of its academic, government, 
and military institutions experienced the destructive and formative effects of the war. The 
creation of the Signal Corps Meteorological Service is an example of a formative effect of the 
war. Throughout the conflict, meteorological science was strained to the limit of its predictive 
capability while the hardware and techniques associated with the procedural gathering of weather 
data were also strained, expanded, and solidified into general practice.  
This thesis will describe the formation and operation of the Signal Corps Meteorological 
Service during and after the First World War in order to highlight both the applied capabilities 






intend to show that the First World War facilitated the expansion of a standardized 
meteorological practice and solidified the relevance of meteorology in both military and 
domestic affairs. The majority of this thesis will be devoted to studying the formation of the 
Meteorological Service, the structure and organization of a typical observation station, and the 
multitude of military services that required meteorological support. Before this, I will summarize 
the practice of meteorology in America up to 1914 before examining a selection of scholarship 
that studies meteorology in America as well as meteorology in the First World War. In my later 
sections I will examine the transition of the Meteorological Service from its overseas wartime 
operations to its domestic peacetime role by analyzing a few articles of a series that advertised 
the recent work of the Service. Finally, I will describe the dissolution and absorption of the 
Service into the Air Corps in 1937 after nearly two decades of chronic underfunding. I intend to 
show that the wartime work of the Meteorological Service utilized and built upon established 
meteorological practice and that the First World War brought more attention (both military and 
civilian) to meteorology than the subject had ever seen in the past. 
 
A Brief History of Meteorology in America 
 Meteorology in the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries was mostly a practice of 
gathering measurements of surface atmospheric conditions in order to generate broad hypotheses 
that described weather phenomena. At this time meteorology was largely studied by “amateurs.” 
Modern scholarship of the history of science utilizes the concept of the “amateur” scientist to 






science before professionalization had begun to formalize the contribution process.1 In the 
context of the history of meteorology in America, amateurs included not only wealthy 
“gentleman” scientists but also non-elites equipped with the instruments necessary to take 
regular weather measurements.2 Thomas Jefferson and James Madison are examples of the 
former group who, in 1778, conducted a meteorological experiment by coordinating their 
observations of pressure, temperature, and winds in order to compare differences in weather 
between two different places.3 Amateur observers like Jefferson and Madison compiled personal 
weather journals—records of observations taken at regular intervals over an extended period of 
time. Ideally, the data in these weather journals could be collected and studied by experienced 
amateurs to shed light on early meteorological problems such as the link between local climate 
and disease or the wind pattern around the eye of a storm. Often discrepancies in the calibration 
and design of measuring instruments made comparing readings impossible while the traditional 
postal service made the exchange of data only useful for compiling climatological statistics. In 
short, meteorology was an “art” that consisted of sporadic and unstandardized observations 
coupled with generalized associations until roughly the second half of the nineteenth century. 
 During the second half of the century, non-elite amateurs cooperated with the 
Smithsonian meteorological organization by faithfully taking weather observations in remote 
locations. Consistency, attention to detail, and procedural discipline were the prime requisites for 
these observers as opposed to wealth or specialized education. This distinction in qualification 
                                                 
1 Conevery B. Valencius et al., “Science in Early America: Print Culture and the Sciences of Territoriality,” 
Journal of the Early Republic 36 (2016): 73-74. 
2 James Rodger Fleming, Meteorology in America, 1800-1870 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1990), 81, 86-87; Valencius, “Science in Early America,” 76. 
3 Fleming, Meteorology in America, 9-10; Charles Bates and John Fuller, America’s Weather Warriors, 1814-






enabled relatively less privileged individuals to share the duty of gathering meteorological data 
for use in forecasting and the study of weather phenomenon. Telegraph officers were prime 
candidates for observation responsibility because they were already grounded at one location and 
were able to properly house instruments and record weather data at regular hours. More 
importantly, a telegraph officer would have direct access to the most useful tool for mass 
observation and forecasting: the telegraph. The availability of new technologies like the 
telegraph as well as the creation of a government organized observation network brought the 
status of meteorology from an amateur hobby to a “barely reputable” science with a small 
presence in the American university.4 Eventually, these non-elite amateurs were phased out as 
meteorological organizations became federalized in the 1870s and as the tasks required of 
contributors became increasingly complex. 
The government weather forecasting and research organization that is known today as the 
National Weather Service was originally founded in 1870 as a branch of the U.S. Army Signal 
Corps. By 1891, the Signal Corps shed its weather responsibilities when the Weather Bureau was 
formed under the Department of Agriculture.5 The Signal Corps and later the domestic Weather 
Bureau operated over a hundred observation stations equipped with standardized measuring 
equipment and a telegraph. These tools helped facilitate their primary duty as a meteorological 
organization: forecasting.6 Forecasts were issued twice daily from the central Weather Bureau 
                                                 
4 Kristine Harper, Weather and Climate: Decade by Decade (New York: Facts On File, 2007), xix. See also 
Fleming, Meteorology in America, 170-74; Harper, Weather and Climate, 1, 7-10. 
5 During the emergency mobilization of the First World War, the Signal Corps would once again take on 
meteorological support responsibilities for the military and operated in tandem with the Weather Bureau in the 
United States. 
6 Bates and Fuller, Weather Warriors, 9-14; Patrick Hughes, A Century of Weather Service: A History of the 
Birth and Growth of the National Weather Service, 1870-1970 (New York: Gordon and Breach, Science Publishers, 







office in Washington D.C. and were meant to predict general weather conditions for the coming 
48 hours in the vicinity of the major signal offices across the United States. Forecasts were made 
by one man, the chief forecaster, who processed and interpreted data as it came in via telegraph 
from the nationwide observation network and was plotted on various synoptic charts of weather 
conditions.7 This forecaster’s ability to read incoming data and issue an accurate forecast was 
fine-tuned from years of exposure to climatological data and experience with forecasting 
procedure. Therefore, forecasting—the main application of meteorological science—could only 
be performed by a handful of highly experienced men with an innate sense of weather behavior 
and the ability to infer patterns in large sets of data. In short, a good forecaster was simply 
“born” and could not be “made.”8 From the 1870s through the 1920s this forecasting structure 
remained unaltered—save for the incorporation of larger amounts and newer kinds of 
atmospheric data. Although the limits of this procedure were known to meteorologists before 
1914, the emergency presented by the First World War and the expansion of meteorology’s 
military application during the conflict highlighted the need for an academic infrastructure for 
both training qualified personnel to work for the weather services and for increasing the accuracy 
of forecasts.  
 
A Historiography of American Meteorology and the First World War  
Data gathering capabilities increased steadily into the twentieth century, but the empirical 
methods by which this data was applied had changed little. By the turn of the last century of 
growth and wider application of the science, meteorology had begun to reach its ceiling of 
                                                 
7 Hughes, Weather Service, 26, 63. 






accuracy which thereby limited the usefulness of empirical meteorological practice. Kristine 
Harper has referred to this era of meteorological science after 1900 and before the Second World 
War as “stagnant” in order to highlight the slowing of meteorology’s growth as a physical 
science in the United States before its launch into the scientific mainstream during the 1950s.9 
 Limits to meteorology’s growth during its “stagnant” period included its weak presence 
in the American university, a scarcity of patronage, and a lack of theoretical research. By 1919, a 
survey conducted by the Department of Education asked 600 universities with an average 
science curriculum about their course offerings in meteorology. Only 70 universities replied that 
they offered meteorology as a separate course while 83 lumped the subject into other courses 
(often geography or physics).10 This study shows that students in higher education had few 
options for pursuing the study of meteorology and that the pool of academically trained 
meteorologists was correspondingly shallow. For that matter, approximately 922 doctoral 
degrees were awarded from 1919–1923, roughly 600, 200, 100, and 20 were awarded in 
chemistry, botany and physics, geology, and astronomy respectively with only two awarded in 
meteorology.11 These statistics were both compiled after the First World War where 
meteorological support of both military and commercial operations was proven to be necessary.  
 This lack of academic presence was further compounded by a shortage of funding in most 
American meteorological services during this period. For instance, funding for Britain’s 
meteorological services was increased by 800% during the First World War whereas American 
                                                 
9 Kristine Harper, Weather by the Numbers: The Genesis of Modern Meteorology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2008), 11. 
10 Harper, Numbers, 51-52, Charles Brooks, “General Extent of Collegiate Instruction in Meteorology and 
Climatology in the United States,” Monthly Weather Review 47 (1919): 169-70. 






spending was only increased by 40% between 1908 and 1919.12 Specifically, the Weather 
Bureau was only allotted $2 million to run over 200 stations in 1921 while the Meteorological 
Service was only allotted $67,400 in 1924 (up from $40,000 in 1923). This can be compared to 
the Office of (agricultural) Experiment Stations which was allotted $250,000 to manage five 
research stations.13 The Weather Bureau and Meteorological Service were hard pressed to 
perform their basic meteorological support duties because of their low budgets. Therefore, they 
could not afford to adequately expand their services or develop their own academic training 
programs to meet the increasing demand for commercial meteorological support during the inter-
war period. 
 These academic and financial troubles also limited the pursuit of theoretical research into 
understanding the origins of meteorological phenomenon during this period. Most 
meteorological work done by government organizations at this time was centered on the 
empirical pursuits of data collection and weather forecasting. The accuracy and range of 
forecasts could only be marginally improved with greater amounts of data and refinements to the 
myriad of rules that described meteorological phenomenon. As early as 1904, Norwegian 
physicist Vilhelm Bjerknes sought to apply mathematics and fluid dynamics to meteorology to 
begin to solve this impasse.14 Unfortunately, the lack of funds and academic foundation caused 
his work to go largely unnoticed and uninvestigated in the United States until the 1930s. After 
                                                 
12 Kristine Harper, “Meteorology’s Struggle for Professional Recognition in the USA (1900-1950),” Annals of 
Science 63 (2006): 187. 
13 John Fuller, Thor’s Legions: Weather Support to the U.S. Air Force and Army: 1937-1987 (Boston: 
American Meteorological Society, 1990), 17. 
14 Harper, Weather and Climate, 7-10, 16-17. This required Bjerknes to convince both physicists and 
meteorologists to work together—a difficult task considering physicists tended to regard meteorology as a matter of 
guessing rather than science, see Harper, “Meteorology’s Struggle,” 181; Robert Friedman, Appropriating the 







the Second World War and decades of slow growth, the introduction of numerous technologies 
(including radar and electronic computers) and the necessary scaling up of government and 
military meteorology organizations facilitated the establishment of meteorology as an academic 
and theoretically rigid science in the United States. 
  At the heart of this “stagnant” period was the First World War. The armed forces of the 
Entente and Central Powers realized early in the war that meteorology needed systematic 
observation because new military technologies—namely long-range artillery, gas, and rigid/non-
rigid aircraft—required meteorological data in order to be effective. The United States was no 
exception and by the summer of 1918 the American Expeditionary Force (A.E.F.) had mobilized 
a meteorological service to support almost every branch of the American armed forces. Most 
scholars of meteorology in twentieth century America who summarize the “stagnant” period give 
a brief mention of the Signal Corps Meteorological Service.  
 Philip Flammer wrote the most complete study to date of the Meteorological Service in 
his 1958 master’s thesis.15 His work provides a basic narrative of the Meteorological Service 
from its founding in 1917 to its dissolution in 1937. It is substantially based on archival 
materials—including the annual reports of the Chief Signal Officer that remain unpublished 
today—personal interviews, and articles from the Monthly Weather Review. His work has also 
stood for over half a century without being substantially contributed to or challenged by more 
recent scholarship with access to new source material. Although scholars can utilize Flammer’s 
work to acquire an idea of the purpose of the Meteorological Service as well as some of the 
limitations it faced during the inter-war period, there is little indication of how the war or the 
                                                 







Service contributed to the science of meteorology. The work of this paper is meant to address 
this shortcoming.  
 Most scholars who wish to verify their section on the First World War’s effect on 
meteorology tend to cite Flammer. For example, Kristine Harper, John Fuller, Charles Bates, 
Rebecca Raines, Robert Friedman, and Frederik Nebeker all provide brief summaries of this 
subject before moving on to the main purpose of their works.16 These summaries range in length 
from the nine page treatment in America’s Weather Warriors to an extended paragraph such as 
that found in the Signal Corps’ official series of branch histories.17 The content of these 
summaries usually include a list of the military’s needs for meteorological support during the 
First World War followed by the observation that the Meteorological Service’s rapid 
demobilization after the armistice limited the continuation of their wartime work. Overall, these 
summaries tend to look at the First World War and the Meteorological Service as an example of 
the inertia of meteorological sciences during the “stagnant” period before moving on to the 
Second World War where more significant events occurred. 
I intend to push back against this summarization trend by building on Flammer’s original 
record of the Meteorological Service via a detailed description of the Service’s methodological 
data gathering duties as well as its interaction with the armed forces. These details will show 
how the wartime work of the Meteorological Service simultaneously emphasized the limitations 
                                                 
16 Kristine Harper, “Boundaries of Research: Civilian Leadership, Military Funding, and the International 
Network Surrounding the Development of Numerical Weather Prediction in the United States” (PhD diss., Oregon 
State University, 2003); Harper, “Meteorology’s Struggle,” 179-99; Harper, Numbers; Harper, Weather and 
Climate; Fuller, Thor’s Legions; Bates and Fuller, Weather Warriors; Rebecca Raines, Getting the Message 
Through: A Branch History of the U.S. Army Signal Corps (Washington: Center of Military History United States 
Army, 1996); Friedman, Appropriating the Weather; Frederik Nebeker, Calculating the Weather: Meteorology in 
the 20th Century (San Diego: Academic Press, 1995). 






of applied meteorology and helped strengthen meteorology’s relevance to a wider audience. 
Although the United States was only mobilized for the First World War for around a year and a 
half, the effect of the war on the science of meteorology was significant and must be studied to 
shed light on this field of study prior to the introduction of new data gathering and processing 
technologies after the Second World War. 
 
The Signal Corps Meteorological Service: Wartime Activities 
Although the United States was not directly involved in First World War until 1917, most 
citizens could follow its passage by reading articles in their favorite magazines and journals. 
Readers of Robert DeCourcy Ward’s series of articles in the Journal of Geography were 
regularly updated about the effects of weather on the war across its fronts. The third installation 
of this series—published in March, 1915—includes a reference to German meteorological 
observers who moved into Belgium to issue local weather forecasts.18 In the fifth issue—
published in November, 1915—Ward describes the German meteorology observation station at 
Uccle and its use of pilot balloons to gather upper air wind data.19 These two references show 
that the German military was at least attempting to provide sophisticated meteorological support 
to its armed forces by 1915. None of the articles of Ward’s 1914–1918 series mention the 
structure, purpose, or existence of the Allied meteorological services that functioned at this time 
(perhaps a measure of censorship was present), but a careful reader could easily surmise that the 
                                                 
18 Robert Ward, “The European Winter and the War,” Journal of Geography 13 (1915): 213. 
19 Robert Ward, “The Weather Factor in the Great War: III,” Journal of Geography 14 (1915): 74-75. By the 
end of the war, Germany had meteorological support integrated into each Army in the field. An Army 
Meteorological Station was located at each headquarters that issued two forecasts daily and worked in close 
conjunction with gas officers and aircraft units. At the divisional level there were observations stations with multiple 






major combatants understood and responded to the necessity of meteorological support in the 
First World War. 
 
Formation of the Meteorological Service 
The United States committed the American Expeditionary Force (A.E.F.) to fight the 
First World War in France on April 6, 1917. By June, the American government was prepared to 
begin building up a complete army in Europe. This task required an expansion in nearly every 
branch of the armed forces, including the creation of a dedicated meteorological service. General 
E. Russel, the chief signal officer of the A.E.F., confirmed the need for this service in June 1917 
when he registered a request for a meteorological support unit.20 Since there was no pre-war 
military meteorology service, one would have to be formed from scratch as soon as possible.  
The responsibility to create this military meteorological service fell to the chief signal 
officer of the Army, General G. O. Squier, for two reasons. First, Squier had recently formed the 
Signal Corps Science and Research Division that was headed by physicist Robert Millikan and 
staffed by many civilian-turned-reservist scientists and engineers.21 Second, the Signal Corps 
controlled the radio and tele-communications of the armed forces and since rapid and reliable 
communications were vital to an effective meteorological service, efficiency could be improved 
                                                 
20 Annual Report of the Chief Signal Officer to the Secretary of War, 1919 (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1919), 347; Bates and Fuller, Weather Warriors, 18; Raines, Message, 190. 
21 Raines, Message, 170-71; Bates and Fuller, Weather Warriors, 18, Robert Millikan, The Autobiography of 
Robert A. Millikan (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), 156; Bertram Sherry and Alan Waterman, “The Military 
Meteorological Service in the United States During the War,” Monthly Weather Review 47 (1919): 216-17. Millikan 
retained his position on the National Research Council in conjunction with his new responsibilities as head of the 
Signal Corps Science and Research Division. Because of his potential work overload, Millikan delegated the task of 
planning the Meteorological Service to five other Signal Corps officers with considerable experience in 
meteorology. Millikan spent the majority of the war involved in various research endeavors that included improving 
sound ranging, gas warfare, and, most prominently, (at least in Millikan’s autobiography) developing a submarine 






if these two operations functioned in the same department. One of the first assignments of the 
Science and Research Division was to form a task force that could develop a plan to create, train, 
and deploy an Army meteorological service.22 By August, the task force submitted a proposal 
that called for 475 enlisted men and 27 officers to staff meteorological observation stations at 
home and abroad.23 125 of these personnel were drawn from Weather Bureau staff while the 
remaining 375 recruits were qualified draftees that were trained in meteorological matters at 
Weather Bureau facilities and later at the Signal Corps School of Meteorology at Texas A&M.24    
 Originally called the “Army Meteorological and Aerological Service,” the Signal Corps 
Meteorological Service was created with a three-fold purpose, according to the 1919 report of 
the chief signal officer:  
(a) To provide the American Expeditionary Forces with all the meteorological information 
needed. 
(b) To supply the aviation fields, the coast artillery stations, the ordnance proving grounds, and 
the gas warfare service within the United States with such meteorological and aerological data as 
might be useful to them. 
(c) To undertake special investigations in military meteorology and related problems.25 
Parts “a” and “b” delegated the responsibility to provide meteorological support where it was 
needed both in France and in the United States to the Meteorological Service. Part “c” is notable 
because it suggests a combination of applied (military) meteorology and academic 
meteorological research. Investigations included the refinement of the one-theodolite method of 
                                                 
22 Bates and Fuller, Weather Warriors, 18-19; Raines, Message, 190.  
23 Annual Report, 347. Each of the following sources reports a different total number of officers and observers 
that were trained and mobilized by the end of the war. Roughly that number stands around 500 to 550, Fuller, Thor’s 
Legions, 10; Robert Millikan, “Some Scientific Aspects of the Meteorological Work of the United States Army,” 
Monthly Weather Review 47 (1919): 210; George Squier, “Meteorological Service of the Army,” Monthly Weather 
Review 47 (1919): 84.  
24 Bates and Fuller, Weather Warriors, 20. Qualifications included graduate level experience in physics, 
mathematics, electrical, mechanical, or civil engineering, or past work with the Weather Bureau, see Annual Report, 
347. 






observing a pilot balloon ascent in the field, the invention of an altitude regulation apparatus to 
facilitate the automated dispersal of propaganda leaflets via balloon, and the gathering of 
meteorological data to create new statistical ballistic wind tables for the artillery.26 These 
meteorological investigations show that meteorological practice in the United States continued to 
grow as a result of the demands for applied meteorology during the First World War. 
 Until the Meteorological Service could be formed, trained, and deployed, the A.E.F. was 
forced to rely on the cooperation of the British and French meteorological services and the 
forecasts issued by the two American meteorological officers present in France. Majors William 
Blair and E. H. Bowie had arrived in September 1917 to provide stop-gap meteorological support 
to the A.E.F. and to prepare for the arrival of the Service by arranging for the extra telegraphic 
equipment necessary for the Service to function efficiently.27 The Meteorological Service began 
establishing observation stations in the Moselle-Argonne sector and the forecasting center at 
Colombey-les-Belles issued its first forecasts under the direction of Major Blair in May 1918.28 
 
Organization of the Meteorological Service  
The Meteorological Service established a network of weather observation stations 
throughout France. This network was connected by telegraph to a central meteorological 
headquarters and to any local military operation that might require emergency warning of 
changing weather conditions. Each station (at least in theory) was outfitted with a host of  
                                                 
26 Sherry and Waterman, “Meteorological Service,” 217-222; Millikan, “Scientific Aspects,” 211-14. These 
investigations will be studied in greater detail below. 
27 Annual Report, 349, 352; Sherry and Waterman, “Meteorology Service,” 216; Bates and Fuller, Weather 
Warriors, 19-20, 22; Flammer, “Meteorology,” 17; Fuller, Thor’s Legions, 11. Blair and Bowie were two of the five 
officers who were originally brought to the Meteorological Service by Millikan in the summer of 1917, see above. 









An illustration taken from the cover pages of the Meteorological Observer training manual showing the beginning of 




This instrument shelter contains heat sensitive instruments that need exposure to the free air and shelter from the 






complicated instruments and tools to gather surface and upper air data. Printed in 1925 for use in 
training Signal Corps cadets, Meteorological Observer: Instructors’ Guide for All Arms contains 
many details about the duties of an observer in the Meteorological Service and what instruments 
they were expected to operate at their station.29 Instruments for measuring surface atmospheric 
conditions included: thermometers (dry bulb, registering maximum and/or minimum, 
thermograph), barometers (mercury, aneroid, barograph), hygrometers (whirling psychrometer, 
hair hygrograph), anemometers (cup, pressure-tube, hand), anemoscopes (wind vanes), a rain 
gauge, a sunshine recorder, and an electric quadruple register. Instruments for measuring upper 
air conditions were rubber pilot balloons and theodolites. All of these instruments had to be 
carefully housed, maintained, and operated in order to guarantee accurate readings over time.  
Figure 1 depicts part of a typical observation station and can be used as a simple 
reference to describe the more notable instruments just listed above. The slotted box on stilts 
next to the person on the right contains heat sensitive equipment that must be exposed to the free 
air while remaining shaded from the sun’s rays. An interior view is shown in Figure 2 where the 
maximum and minimum thermometers, a thermograph, a hair hygrograph, and whirling 
psychrometer are neatly arranged. These instruments facilitated the measurement of atmospheric 
temperature and humidity at the surface. This information was largely relevant to forecasters 
because surface visibility and fog conditions could be predicted in advance by regular 
measurements of humidity and temperature. Forecasts of these conditions were distributed to 
                                                 
29 Meteorological Observer: Instructors’ Guide for All Arms (Washington: Government Printing House, 1925). 
Although this source that I draw most of the following details from describes the ideal operations, training, and 
equipment of the Meteorological Service circa 1925, I think these ideals remained effectively the same since the 
founding of the service in 1917. Naturally, it should be kept in mind that wartime stations surely experienced 
various difficulties and deficiencies with equipment and training that limited each station’s effectiveness in one way 







multiple branches of the armed forces in order to prevent incidents ranging from aircraft 
accidents to surprise attacks at the front.30  
At the center of Figure 1 there are two poles mounted with wind vanes and Robinson cup 
anemometers. The wind vanes are designed with flared tails to be especially sensitive to light 
winds. The guide also alludes to how the wind vane may betray the location and purpose of an 
observation station to the enemy. A list of alternate and more inconspicuous tools for measuring 
wind direction is provided, including flags, smoke, and the proverbial wetted finger.31 Robinson 
cup anemometers record the amount of wind that has passed in a given interval of time. This 
required the observer to compute the value for wind speed—a process that necessitated careful 
training—as opposed to simply reading the value from a gauge.  
Another notable feature is the arrangement of the two poles; one is about eight feet high 
while the other is about twenty. This arrangement accounts for the fact that wind conditions can 
drastically differ between elevations at the near surface level (see Figure 3). Since cloud gas 
attacks occurred at these low elevations and were reliant on favorable winds, the extremely 
variable wind conditions of these elevations had to be measured as accurately as possible in 
order to facilitate better localized forecasts. Thus, the flared tail design of the wind vanes used by 
the Meteorological Service allowed these sensitive instruments to respond to minute changes in 
wind direction, and the accurate and constant register of wind speed given by the anemometers 
alerted observers to rapid changes in wind speed. Effective use of—and defense against— 
poisonous gas depended on this meteorological support and necessitated the original expansion 
of meteorological units in 1915 (see section: Chemical Warfare). 
                                                 
30 Signal Corps Field Manual, Vol. II (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1931): 167-68. 








This image shows how even a gentle difference in wind direction between altitudes can completely alter the wind 
conditions over a small difference of altitude. Source: Hughes, Weather Service, 136. 
The other two people in Figure 1 are in the process of performing a pilot balloon 
sounding from which they will deduce the wind conditions of the upper air to altitudes 
approaching 12 miles. Pilot balloon sounding is often the focus of many sources that provide 
details about the Meteorological Service and its activities during the First World War.32 Indeed, 
Sherry and Waterman claimed that obtaining upper air data was the main outstanding problem of 
the Meteorological Service to which there were eight possible solutions (see Table 1).33  
 
 
                                                 
32 Annual Report, 350-52; Millikan, “Scientific Aspects,” 210-11; Sherry and Waterman, “Meteorological 
Service,” 216-21; C. J. P. Cave, “Some Notes on Meteorology in War Time,” Quarterly Journal of the 
Meteorological Society 47 (1921): 9. 







Methods of Gathering Upper Air Data 
Methods that can facilitate the 
measurement of temperature, 
barometric pressure, humidity, and 
wind speed. 
Methods that can facilitate only the 
measurement of wind speed and 
direction. 
1. Sounding-balloons 
2. Manned (free) balloons 
3. Observation (kite) balloons 
4. Kites 
5. Airplanes 
1. Pilot balloons 
2. Anti-aircraft shell bursts 
3. Sound-ranging a pilot 
balloon which carries a 
train of explosives. 
 
Table 1  
Compiled from information in Sherry and Waterman, “Meteorological Service,” 216-217. 
Despite the wider range of data gathered by the first column, these five methods were 
disqualified for one reason or another. Sounding-balloons were slow to deliver the data gathered 
by its instrument package because the observer had to recover it after it parachuted back to the 
ground (assuming that it had settled in friendly territory). Manned (free) balloons suffer from this 
same uncertainty of landing and were also limited in observation ceiling. Kite balloons required 
expensive reels and motors to operate, were limited in maximum altitude, and were dangerous to 
operate in high winds. Although proven effective by use in domestic research settings before the 
war, kites were poor candidates for military use because a kite’s steel wires required large open 
spaces were a local electrical infrastructure would not expose meteorological personnel to the 
danger of electrocution. Airplanes at this time could not obtain accurate measurements of wind 
velocity, were vulnerable to enemy interception, and required too much supplemental equipment 
for consistent operation. 
The methods of the second column were limited in the measurements that could be 






meteorological factors that affected artillery, gas warfare, and the balloon and aviation services, 
any method that could best gather this data would be highly valued. Observations of anti-aircraft 
shell bursts and sound-ranging a series of explosions emanating from a pilot balloon were 
disqualified because their reliance on other branches of the Army would necessitate a 
complicated divergence of material and servicemen.34 This left the pilot balloon as the most 
reliable, cost-effective, and replicable method to regularly gather and distribute upper air data 
despite its main limitation of poor visibility in overcast skies.  
Pilot balloon sounding necessitated the use of one or more theodolites to track the upward 
progress of the spherical rubber balloon that was about 80 to 120 centimeters in diameter and 
sometimes colored red to improve visibility in cloudy conditions.35 Originally, two theodolites 
were stationed at opposite ends of a fixed base line and their simultaneous readings of angle of 
elevation and azimuth were plotted to show the ascent of the balloon. Upon adoption by the 
Meteorological Service, the two-theodolite method was immediately improved by using only one 
theodolite, thus eliminating the need for a measured base line and cutting down on equipment.36 
Observers could substitute the rate of ascent of a pilot balloon with a pre-calculated value since it 
was found that pilot balloons ascend at a uniform rate (assuming identical dimensions and 
inflation pressure), effectively removing the variable that required the other theodolite. Because 
uniformity in balloon weight was difficult to achieve, a formula for calculating an adjusted rate 
of ascent for each balloon was developed by Lieutenants W. S. Bowen and H. Anderson at the 
Signal Corps School of Meteorology. They conducted experiments to generate enough data to 
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find a statistical average rate of ascent by measuring the descent of various balloons dropped in 
the interior of a high building.37 Despite these improvements the substitution of the ascent 
variable remained imperfect and one theodolite observations were always less accurate than two 
theodolite observations. According to Major W. Reed, an officer of the Meteorological Service 
during the war, observers preferred to have data from one theodolite observations spread over a 
wide area as opposed to more accurate two theodolite observations from only a few locations.38  
 
Figure 4  
This ML-55 plotting board was used to track the relative position and altitude of an ascending pilot balloon in order 
to show wind speed and direction. This figure shows a plotted balloon ascent beginning in the center and turning to 
the bottom right. Source: Meteorological Observer, 239. 
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Most meteorological observation stations supporting the A.E.F. in France and the armed 
forces in the United States were equipped to regularly sound the upper air with a single 
theodolite. Soundings were routinely carried out at least three times a day—more if local combat 
operations required more frequent updates.39 A typical sounding consisted of a 21 step process 
where one observer (after the balloon was properly inflated with hydrogen from a cylinder) 
released the balloon while another observer tracked its upward progress with a theodolite. 
Following a stopwatch or automatic buzzer, the angles of elevation and azimuth were recorded at 
regular intervals on “Form 201—Met’l” until sight of the balloon had been lost.40 The recorded 
data was then transferred to a number of plotting boards and charts (see Figure 4) to quickly 
deduce wind data for use by gas warfare officers, aviators, and the artillery.  
Figure 4 contains the results of a pilot balloon sounding and graphically represents 
multiple registers of wind data. The center of the chart is the launch point of the balloon and each 
tick-mark is the position of the pilot balloon after one fixed interval of time. By comparing the 
line of these tick-marks to the epicenter of the chart the observer could determine the direction of 
the wind at known altitudes (given that pilot balloons ascend at a regular rate). This chart shows 
that the winds near the surface were blowing the pilot balloon toward the north-northwest and 
shifted to the south-southeast as the balloon reached higher altitudes. By comparing the distance 
between each tick-mark the observer could also determine wind velocity between points. The 
greater the distance between tick-marks, the greater distance the balloon traveled from the 
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epicenter in the fixed interval of time and therefore, the higher the wind speed. In one chart, 
relevant wind condition data at a range of altitudes could be quickly and efficiently 
communicated to artillery, aviation, and gas warfare officers.  
 Finally, the last important instrument of a typical station was a triad of barometers that 
facilitated the measurement of atmospheric pressure at surface level. Barometers are not included 
in Figure 1 because a mercury barometer cannot be exposed to wind or direct sunlight, and 
aneroid barometers and barographs are susceptible to damage from sudden pressure changes 
(such as the firing of a nearby artillery piece).41 Barometric readings required the observer to 
calculate a correction for the elevation and temperature of the instrument in order to arrive at a 
standardized result. Tracking the parabolic trend of barometric pressure (easily facilitated by 
following the line of the barograph) was important because a sudden drop in barometric pressure 
could indicate the approach of a storm.42 Sudden storms were especially dangerous at a time 
when a whole squadron of aircraft could be blown away and wrecked if caught out on an airfield 
during a storm or passing squall line. The Meteorological Service was expected to watch for 
these drops in pressure and issue storm warnings to nearby aerodromes.43 
Clearly these meteorological observation stations were well equipped to gather a wide 
range of data and could be expected to guarantee a high level of accuracy. The key structure that 
facilitated the fully effective operation of these stations was the sophisticated and efficient 
communications system that linked these stations to the central Meteorological Service  
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Figure 5  
Each dot represents a meteorological observation station connected by (telegraph) lines to the forecasting 
headquarters at Colomby-les-belles, near Chaumont. Source: Blair, “Aviation,” 289-290. 
headquarters.44 Figure 5 shows the approximate location of each important observation station 
and its connection to the communications network that brought all data to the weather 
forecasting headquarters at Colombey les Belles.45 This network was trafficked four times a day 
by meteorological messages that carried data for two forecasts, issued at 6pm and 8am.46 
Observation stations at the front were established in pairs to stagger the observation duties by the 
hour in order to lower radio traffic. These stations were also prepared to provide meteorological 
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data and storm warnings directly to relevant units via telephone or wireless.47 The work of this 
expansive network of observation stations was facilitated by the communications technology that 
enabled the rapid transmission of weather data across France. Control of this communications 
network was one of the main reasons for why the Signal Corps was given the responsibility of 
administering military meteorology in 1917.  
 
Military Applications of Meteorological Support 
The Signal Corps Meteorological Service was designed to facilitate meteorological 
observation and forecasting for the A.E.F. as well as the rest of the incoming American armed 
forces. Many branches of the armed forces could utilize some form of meteorological support, 
including: the artillery, counter-battery sound-ranging units, offensive and defensive gas warfare 
companies, powered flight and balloon aviators, high command, and the Army Corps of 
Engineers. Most scholarship on the history of meteorology simply provides a short summary of 
these needs.48 What follows is a more detailed description of these meteorological needs 
beginning with the foremost user of meteorological data before the expansion of gas and aerial 
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Field Artillery  
As the militaries of Europe clashed in the Balkans, France, and Poland during the 
opening months of the First World War, the lack of meteorological data available for military use 
was primarily felt by the artillery. Traditionally, artillerymen ensured accurate fire by “zeroing 
in” their guns. This process entailed firing rounds at a fixed target and, after observing the results 
of this volley, re-laying the guns with the necessary corrections for the next volley. By 1914, 
artillery pieces could easily achieve ranges that exceeded the observational limit of the naked eye 
which made it impossible for an artillery battery to watch the results of their preliminary zeroing 
shots. Although another observation party could relay the results of the shots back to the battery 
via radio or written message, “zeroing in” required too much time, wasted shells on preliminary 
shots, and could not maintain the element of surprise in the case of a shock assault. If an artillery 
battery was to provide accurate and effective support then it had to account for all the mechanical 
and meteorological factors that may divert a shell during its trajectory through the atmosphere 
and apply the necessary corrections for these factors on the first volley.  
Mechanical influences included the powder load of a shell, the age of the artillery piece, 
and the weight of the shell being used. These mechanical influences on the trajectory of a shell 
were easily determined by an experienced artillery crew already familiar with their practice and 
equipment. On the other hand, the meteorological factors that affected a shell in flight were 
elusive and complicated to measure. The meteorological factors were counted as four in number 
during the war: temperature, atmospheric pressure, hygrometric (humidity) condition, and wind 
speed and direction.49 These five conditions needed to be known at all altitudes beginning at the 
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muzzle of the gun to the ceiling of the shell’s trajectory if fire was going to be accurate. For 
example, Bertram Sherry and Alan Waterman’s article in the Monthly Weather Review included 
a general example of the effect of an opposing wind on a projectile: “[F]iring the 75-mm gun at a 
target 7,000 meters away an opposing wind of 10 meters per second will cause the projectile to 
fall nearly 400 meters (a quarter of a mile) short of the target.”50 Clearly, a modern artillery 
detachment required accurate and current meteorological data to provide support at long ranges.  
Measuring these conditions was an assignment that required specialized training and 
timeliness in order to be effective. A typical Meteorological Service observation station was well 
prepared to gather and distribute this weather data. A thermometer, barometer, and psychrometer 
could provide surface values of temperature, pressure, and humidity, while a pilot balloon 
sounding could determine the wind conditions of the upper air.  
 The mathematically distilled average correction for the wind conditions in each layer of 
atmosphere (about 1,500 feet deep) encountered on a projectile’s trajectory was known as a 
“ballistic wind.”51 Arriving at this figure required both meteorological personnel and 
artillerymen to utilize numerous tables and charts to graphically compute the raw meteorological 
data into a simple correction value. Alongside the gathering of this meteorological data, the 
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Meteorological Service’s tasks included the development of similar, region and gun specific, 
charts and calculating aids to be issued to all batteries in the United States and France.52  
By the end of the war, the Meteorological Service was supplying American artillery 
detachments with meteorological data and ballistic wind values relevant to their geographic 
location, enabling a detachment to provide accurate artillery support while minimizing the undue 
waste of shells.53 Robert Millikan (originally tasked with forming the Meteorological Service in 
1917) claimed that “[a]t the time of the signing of the armistice on the western front the Air 
Service and all the artillery were being furnished every two hours with the temperature, density, 
wind velocity, and direction, taken at the surface and at various altitudes, from 100 to 500 meters 
apart, up to 5,000 meters.”54 By the end of the First World War, any battery without close 
meteorological support could not meet the increased level of sophistication and performance that 
artillery was now expected to achieve.  
 
Sound Ranging  
The Sound Ranging Section, the Gas Regiment, and the Air Service were three new 
branches of the armed forces that required meteorological support in order to function. Sound 
ranging was developed during the war and was a highly specialized and sensitive form of counter 
battery work based on the principles of acoustic physics. Artillery batteries were often highly 
camouflaged to avoid detection—and subsequent bombardment—by the enemy. Detection could 
be facilitated by aerial observation (from both planes and tethered balloons), by flash spotting 
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(deducing location by correlating muzzle flashes and artillery reports), and by sound ranging. 
Although it required specialized listening equipment and complicated mathematical processes to 
render usable data, sound ranging could be used to determine the location, caliber, and number of 
shots fired from an enemy battery with exceptional accuracy.55 
In short, a battery was located by registering the arrival of the sound wave generated by 
the charge of an artillery piece as it traveled across a measured baseline. When these minor 
differentiations in the sound wave’s time of arrival (measured in hundredths of a second) were 
triangulated with the readings from multiple locations, the location of the battery could be 
determined via triangulation (see Figures 6 and 7).56 Since the speed of sound waves through 
   
Figure 6 and Figure 7   
Figure 6 (left) illustrates how the position of an enemy gun could be graphically calculated while Figure 7 (right) 
shows an ideal frontline arrangement of microphone “listening” stations that could record the arrival of a sound 
wave once switched on by a forward observation post. Source: Innes, Flash Spotters, 130, 132. 
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the atmosphere is relevant to the composition of said atmosphere, sound ranging is affected by 
temperature, humidity, barometric pressure, and wind conditions. Considering that sound ranging 
calculations had an extremely narrow margin of error, accurate meteorological data was vital to 
the effective operation of a sound ranging unit. The Meteorological Service was equipped to 
regularly gather this data at the surface, and wind conditions at higher elevations if necessary.57 
Without this meteorological data—especially that of the wind conditions—no correction for its 
effects on the travel of sound waves could be applied and attempts at sound ranging would have 
been futile. 
 
Chemical Warfare  
Poison gas, perhaps the most infamous innovation of the First World War, was a novel 
weapon that was completely dependent on close meteorological support, especially in its early 
form. Gas was first deployed effectively en masse by Germany on the evening of April 22, 1915 
near the small Belgian town of Ypres. After a brief German artillery bombardment, a mysterious 
haze was spotted to be gathering over the German trenches. Eventually the haze gathered into a 
greenish cloud that slowly crept along only a few feet from the ground. The light winds carried 
the gas across no-man’s-land and into the Allied trenches, forcing the French colonial troops to 
either abandon their positions or be asphyxiated.58 The first major poison gas attack at Ypres 
utilized about 6,000 cylinders to release chlorine gas from a 7 km section of the German front 
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line trenches.59 This early form of delivering poison gas was used during the first years of 
widespread chemical warfare despite its complete dependence on meteorological conditions, 
especially the direction and speed of surface winds. 
Robert DeCourcy Ward’s previously mentioned series of articles include a few 
considerations of the meteorological aspect of cloud gas warfare. As early as June, 1915, Ward 
mentioned an event that grimly highlights how both the recipient and the perpetrator of a 
cylinder gas attack were at the mercy of the winds once the chemical gathers in the atmosphere. 
“[T]he wind which, on one occasion, had been carrying the deadly asphyxiating gases used by 
the Germans towards the Allies’ trenches, suddenly changed, blowing these same gases back to 
the German lines, and forcing the men to flee for their lives.”60 This report emphasized the 
importance of predicting the behavior of the wind as accurately as possible leading up to a cloud 
gas attack. In the next article of his series, Ward surmised that the German meteorological 
observers must have possessed a system to carefully predict the wind conditions before their gas 
attacks because of the infrequent occurrence of easterly winds in Western Europe.61  
By the time the Meteorological Service was fully operational in France, gas warfare had 
changed. New gases like phosgene and mustard gas were often delivered in artillery shells (as 
opposed to clouds) and attacks were harder to predict because preparation for an attack was 
quicker and the cooperation of the wind was no longer absolutely vital. The Meteorological 
Service continued to support chemical defense measures by issuing warnings to sectors where 
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the weather favored an enemy gas attack.62 Like the artillery’s need for meteorological support, 
the offensive use of gas entailed the application of meteorological data to minimize waste and 
increase the chances of success on the first attack in order to surprise and poison the enemy 
before they could don their gasmasks. Support would have to be extremely localized to account 
for an area’s topography and observations had to be frequently taken to watch for any 
unfavorable changes in wind speed or direction.63 Tools like the previously mentioned 
anemometers and wind vanes were used to record current surface conditions at multiple 
elevations while pilot balloon soundings facilitated the tracking of changes in upper air 
conditions which could indicate future changes in surface wind behavior. By the end of the war, 
the deployment of effective gasmasks and the use of more sophisticated gas delivery methods 
had lessened the effect of meteorological conditions on gas warfare, but efficient and localized 
meteorological support was still necessary to prevent self-inflicted gassings and surprise gas 
raids by the enemy. 
 
Aerial Operations  
The most urgent call for meteorological support emanated from the Signal Corps 
Aviation Section (known as the Army Air Service after 1918). This service required a steady 
supply of data and condition reports to protect its fragile equipment and the lives of its aviators. 
Almost every aspect of the Air Service’s operations were affected by meteorological conditions, 
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including balloon observations, aircraft flight (especially takeoff and landing), and aerodrome 
construction and maintenance.   
High winds, particularly those associated with a passing squall, threatened tethered 
observation balloons and the wood and canvas airplanes of the time. Gusts could easily carry 
away and smash loose aircraft or break the tethers anchoring a balloon to the ground. A strong 
wind in the wrong direction could also cause a flight of aircraft to drift and miss their intended 
target or destination, leaving them without a designated (or friendly) airfield to land at.64 Cloud 
and fog conditions could also pose a problem to aviators, for instance, a low blanket of clouds 
could make an accurate bombing raid futile and—upon returning from this failed night raid—the 
flight may find that a morning fog has completely obscured their landing strip.65  
The Meteorological Service was required to determine wind and cloud conditions at 
necessary flight altitudes as well as issue emergency storm warnings in order to support the Air 
Service’s operations.66 Pilot balloon soundings and cloud observations were employed to gather 
wind and cloud data which was regularly distributed to local aviation and balloon officers.67 This 
data was used by aviators to determine a wind correction value for navigation and bomb 
dropping while reconnaissance balloon officers used these reports to keep their balloons in the 
air as long as conditions possibly allowed. Although by the end of the war new techniques and 
technologies allowed aviators to fly in increasingly hostile conditions (high winds, through 
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clouds, in heavy rain, etc.), the need for meteorological support was not lessened.68 Indeed, after 
the armistice the Meteorological Service’s largest request for support was consistently from the 
Army Air Service which eventually came to absorb the meteorological duties of the Signal Corps 
in 1937. 
 
Army Corps of Engineers  
The Meteorological Service also used statistical meteorology to support the construction 
of more-or-less permanent military facilities. Statistical meteorology refers to using the vast 
record of past meteorological reports for a specific region to determine estimates of future 
conditions like the average intensity and direction of winds, average number of days with good 
visibility, or the average number of foggy mornings at a particular location. Determining the 
location of a new airdromes required the most consideration of statistical meteorology prior to its 
construction. 69 Locations had to be found with the lowest average number of foggy days and a 
regular wind direction in order to orient the hangar and landing strip accordingly and to help 
ensure that the airdrome did not close due to unsafe weather conditions. Other facilities, like 
artillery and chemical warfare training sites, needed to take average visibility and wind 
conditions into account in order to operate effectively and with as little interference from the 
weather as possible. 
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Probably the most common form of support rendered by the Meteorological Service, 
forecasting was a highly technical and sophisticated data gathering and synthesizing process by 
which nearly every branch of the A.E.F. was regularly updated on their local weather conditions. 
What follows is an example forecast report issued to American forces stationed in the Argonne 
sector in November.  
  Forecast A1. Argonne until 6p.m. 1 Nov. 
A. Weather fair for all arms except for aviation and observation in the forenoon. 
B. Surface winds, 1–5 m/s East. 
At 2,000 meters, 3–8 m/s East to Southeast. 
At 5,000 meters, 4–8 m/s Southwest to West. 
C. Overcast, with occasional large clear spaces in forenoon.  
Clear to one-half cloudy in afternoon.  
Fog until afternoon, Haze all day. 
D. Cloud height, 3,000 m. with occasional lower masses 1,200 m. 
E. Visibility, very poor, 1–2 km. until noon, improving to 3 to 5 km. in afternoon. 
F. No rain. 
G. Maximum temperature, 10°C. 
K. Odds in favor of forecast, 6–1. 
Issued at 6:10 a.m.70 
 A forecast like this was tailored to meet the basic meteorological needs of all the 
branches of the A.E.F. as outlined above. For instance, section B lists wind conditions at multiple 
elevations which are readily usable by the artillery for rudimentary wind corrections and for gas 
offense and defense at the front line. If surface winds were forecasted to be blowing north or 
west, then the whole sector would most likely remain on gas alert until the next forecast 
indicated more favorable conditions. This forecast was one of two for the next 24-hour period, 
the other being issued around 8 a.m.71 Forecasts for conditions up to a week in advance could 
also be issued on request in order to help facilitate planning of an offensive or the spoiling of an 
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enemy’s preparations to take advantage of a favorable spell of good weather.72 The military 
application of this forecast is also encapsulated by its direct language and the included estimation 
of the strength of the prediction (section K). The elimination of qualifying terms such as 
“probable” and “possibly” helped these forecasts appear clearer and more reliable to the officers 
in the field.73 This more confident language implied that the forecasts issued by the 
Meteorological Service had achieved a greater level of accuracy compared to the pre-war 
domestic forecasts of the Weather Bureau.  
Although this belief helped facilitate confident decision-making at the front, the empirical 
forecasting methods of the Meteorological Service during the First World War were effectively 
the same as those provided by the Signal Corps fifty years ago during the Civil War. Forecasts 
were built by constructing a series of synoptic weather maps that charted various meteorological 
data (isobaric pressure, temperature, wind conditions, etc.), then consulting the best available 
archive of past meteorological data for the concerned region and time, and finally applying a 
wealth of personal experience in meteorological work to make an educated prediction of future 
weather conditions.74 Essentially, this process was effective enough to meet the needs of the 
A.E.F. during the war, but many meteorologists were continually frustrated with its limitations, 
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namely, its lack of formulaic rigor and its reliance on the “untrainable” experience of a seasoned 
forecaster.75  
By the end of the war, changes in the scope and procedure of empirical forecasting were 
beginning to become formalized into general practice. For instance, the requirement of a 
background in physics or mathematics in order to be accepted into the Signal Corps School of 
Meteorology reflected the increasing tendency to relate the physics of the air to forecasting and 
the study of meteorology in general.76 Another change in scope was the conception of the 
atmosphere as a layered, interactive, three-dimensional body which had to be regularly sounded 
and included as a piece in the synoptic charting series.77 In decades preceding the First World 
War, the value of upper-air data to forecasting was advertised by aerologists—those concerned 
specifically with studying the upper-air. By 1918, military technologies like aircraft and artillery 
brought the regular study of these higher layers of the atmosphere into the scope of meteorology. 
These changes in scope and procedure show that, as a result of its military application, 
meteorological practice had been driven to a higher level of complex procedure that required at 
least advanced training to carry out. Although these trends support the conclusion of a general 
shift from empiricism to a dynamic science of meteorology, this shift was slow, especially in the 
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Philosophical Society 48 (1909): 33; Mark Harrington, “Systematic Exploration of the Upper Air with Estimates of 






United States where meteorology continued to have a minimal academic and research presence 
after the war.78  
 
Armistice and Demobilization  
At the conclusion of hostilities on the Western Front in 1918, the Meteorological Service 
was a fully-functioning organization that provided first-rate meteorological support for a diverse 
range of military applications. The end of the war also meant that the Meteorological Service 
would have to transition into a peacetime service. Regardless of the relatively sudden integration 
of meteorology into military practice during the war, the Meteorological Service remained an 
essential department of the U.S. Army that would not be disbanded or merged with the Weather 
Bureau simply because the “emergency” was over. In fact, at least fifty-one meteorological 
stations were estimated to be necessary to provide adequate support during peacetime.79 This 
demand for peacetime meteorological support shows that military meteorology had become an 
integrated and indispensable facet of a modern armed force over the course of a single conflict. 
Unfortunately, the rapid demobilization of the A.E.F. after the armistice greatly 
contributed to the Meteorological Section’s struggle to make this transition and to continue 
providing meteorological support to military and civilian organizations. Scholars tend to 
characterize this demobilization period as a “race for home.”80 At the head of this race were 
                                                 
78 For example, one of the few options for higher level study of meteorology during the war was a series of ten 
lectures given by Robert DeCourcy Ward through MIT that included instruction on the relation of the physics of the 
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79 Flammer, “Meteorology,” 33-34, these fifty-one stations were a combination of the various requests for 
meteorological support stations from the Coast Artillery (thirty-five), the artillery (four), the Ordinance Corps (two), 
and the Air Service (ten). 






Meteorological Service personnel both in France and the United States (including Lt. Col. Robert 
Millikan) who wished to return to civilian occupations and to avoid the “absurdly low salaries” 
they expected to earn in a peacetime army.81 Despite training over 500 meteorological personnel 
for wartime work, by April 1919 the Meteorological Service failed to retain more than eleven 
officers and forty-nine enlisted men to staff only eleven stateside stations out of the fifty-one 
estimated to be necessary for peacetime operations.82 This severe shortage of trained personnel 
was combined with a deficient budget and a steady increase in responsibility which led the 
Meteorological Service to perform at a level consistently below its standard set during the First 
World War.  
 
The Signal Corps Meteorological Service: Interwar Conflicts and Dissolution 
 
New Directions and Developments 
 Understaffed and underfunded, the Meteorological Service entered into the interwar 
period and struggled to reach an adequate level of operation until 1937 when the Service was 
dissolved and its assets absorbed into the Air Corps’ own “Air Weather Service.” Chronic 
personnel shortages were a symptom of two conditions. First, the amateur meteorological 
observer could no longer be called upon to share in weather data gathering duties.  The amateur 
observer was excluded from the Meteorological Service primarily because the Service was a 
military organization and only enlisted men who received training in meteorology could perform 
the necessary work. The fact that the Signal Corps put the employees of the Meteorological 
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Service through training reflects the increasing complexity of meteorological work. Gathering 
adequate weather data was relatively simple in 1900, adjusting and reading a barometer or 
operating a sling psychrometer for instance. But by the end of the First World War, a 
Meteorological Service observer was expected to operate a multitude of instruments—many of 
which, as shown previously, required sophisticated calculations and graphing to render useable 
results—and to possess a basic understanding of the various military applications of the weather 
data being gathered.83  
Indeed, by the 1920s there was a marked division between the meteorological work done 
by Meteorological Service personnel and the amateur observer. In a short book titled Weather 
and Weather Instruments for the Amateur, Taylor Instrument Companies (the publisher) sought 
to simplify the reading of weather instruments and to help laymen forecast the weather.84 The 
book contains a multitude of tips, diagrams, charts, and definitions including: how to use a 
barometer, thermometer, and compass as well as a chapter on humidity’s effect on health and a 
page of rhyming couplets titled “Weather Lore”.85 Although an experienced amateur observer 
(or, perhaps more accurately, a hobbyist observer) could be trained relatively quickly to perform 
the more complex tasks of the Meteorological Service, the contents of the book show that the 
scope of amateur weather work was far exceeded by the Service’s daily peacetime observational 
routine. For example, beyond a short section describing cloud types and general conditions 
preceding rain, there is no mention of the importance of upper air conditions in forecasting. This 
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is because sounding these altitudes required highly specialized equipment and training beyond 
the means of an average amateur.  
The second condition that contributed to shortages was that students and universities 
continued to show low interest in meteorology during and after the First World War.86 This low 
interest was due in part to the confused perception of meteorology as a loosely defined set of 
practices closely related to astronomy and climatology. The New Christian Herald’s 
encyclopedia entry on meteorology is an illustration of one such muddled definition. 
Meteorology, that branch of science which observes, registers, classifies, and compares 
the various and varying phenomena of our atmosphere. It remarks, at the same time, the 
connection of those phenomena with heavenly bodies, and with the solid and liquid materials of 
the earth, in reference to their reciprocal and combined influence in determining the character of 
different climates, and with the view of learning the meteoric history of every region of our globe, 
of ultimately investigating the laws of atmospheric change and the plan of meteoric action; the 
theory, in fact, of meteorological phenomena, on which depends essentially the fitness of the 
various portions of the earth’s surface for the production of different vegetable and other 
substances, and for the support of animal life. 
Birds and beasts are all more or less sensitive to coming changes in the weather, and by 
observation of their movements, sure warning of changes in the weather may be obtained.87 
 
This entry is worth quoting nearly in its entirety because it crafts an image of meteorology that 
professional meteorologists would have contested at the time of its publishing in 1919. For 
instance, the assertion that meteorology remarks on the connection between climates, the 
“heavenly bodies,” and the non-gaseous materials of the earth does not align with the precise and 
structured work of enlisted Meteorological Service personnel. Furthermore, the last suggestion 
that weather changes may be forecast by simply observing the behavior of animals is almost 
comical considering the sophisticated infrastructure of interconnected observation stations that 
facilitated forecasting during the First World War. Yet the last clause still contains a degree of 
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truth in that the seasoned forecaster’s wealth of experience and innate ability to synthesize 
weather data into a reputable report was essentially little different than observing the instinctual 
reactions of animals honed by evolution.  
The misconceptions surrounding meteorological work that continued after the First 
World War were addressed by institutions like the Monthly Weather Review. This journal, 
published by the American Meteorological Society since 1872, tried to drum up interest and 
attention to meteorological research and the meteorological organizations that were suffering 
from personnel shortages. By publicizing the wartime activities of the Meteorological Service as 
well as its current meteorological research endeavors and the careers in the field of meteorology 
that it offered, these articles sought to spread awareness of the Service’s role in the First World 
War and the future of the increasingly airborne modern world.88 These articles also reflect the 
internal pressures that brought changes to the purpose and activity of the Service during this 
period of shortage. These pressures simultaneously contributed to the exacerbation of the 
Service’s operational limitations while increasing the relevance of the Service by bringing in 
new clients that were in need of meteorological support. I will examine two articles from this list 
that highlight this pressure for change and adaptation. 
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General Squier, the Chief Signal officer who initiated the formation of the 
Meteorological Service in 1917, modified the list of purposes of the Service in his post-war 
article that described the Service for the interested readers of the Monthly Weather Review 
(previously discussed in “Formation of the Meteorological Service”). Notably, he replaced task 
“c” with: “[t]o undertake for the first time in history of the world the problems of mapping the 
upper-air currents over the United States, Atlantic, and western Europe in aid of aviation, and 
particularly with reference to trans-Atlantic flight.”89 This modification shows that Squier 
recognized that the work of the Meteorological Service was relevant to organizations that were 
interested in commercializing trans-Atlantic flight. Given the massive demobilization that 
occurred after the armistice and the steadily increasing financial troubles of the American 
government, this wider relevance would become more important to the Meteorological Service 
as a justification of its demand for increased funding priority. The dramatic tone of the first 
clause was also intended to attract attention to the pioneering activities happening in 
meteorological studies at the time. Trans-Atlantic flight was an especially popular subject that 
caught public attention with superstar pilots competing to set flight records. At the time of this 
article’s publication (February 1919), groups of aviators from a number of nations were gearing 
up to win glory for their nation as well as the Daily Mail’s reward of £10,000 for the first 
successful transatlantic flight completed under 72 hours.90 These ambitious flights required the 
close support of meteorological organizations to have any hope of success. Squier’s reference to 
the Meteorological Service’s pioneering upper air work and its link to facilitating trans-Atlantic 
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flight was his attempt to attract attention to the Service from the population concerned with 
developing this new technological feat into a commercial endeavor. 
Later in the article, Squier elaborated on how this upper air sounding was conducted. The 
Meteorological Service staffed 26 stations that were spread across the United States and 
conducted daily pilot balloon soundings up to 35,000 feet before reporting their data to 
Washington D.C. where upper air wind charts were compiled.91 The growing archive of upper air 
wind condition data was showing that 95% of winds above 10,000 feet are from west to east and 
are often in excess of 100 mph.92 This tendency was an important discovery for early long-range 
aviators because it disproved the theory that winds could be escaped at high enough altitudes and 
showed that the direction of travel determined one’s ideal flight altitude. Squier’s article 
highlights how the work of the Meteorological Service contributed to the exploration of the 
upper air and to the conception of the atmosphere as a layered, three-dimensional structure. 
Although the Meteorological Service had established a functioning upper air sounding 
network in the United States during the war, soundings of upper air conditions over the Atlantic 
remained impossible. This forced meteorologists to rely on extrapolation and inference based on 
data from the United States and Europe to issue forecasts of upper air conditions over the 
Atlantic. In his article about the four scientific investigations of the Meteorological Service 
during the war, Robert Millikan—the head of the National Research Council during the war—
described the long-range propaganda balloons engineered by the Service as well as the potential 
application of their altitude stabilization technology to regularly sound the upper air over the 
Atlantic. His article credits three servicemen with inventing an apparatus that counteracted the 
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natural diffusion of hydrogen from a pilot balloon by regularly expending liquid kerosene (which 
expands into a gas at low pressure) causing re-inflation and re-ascension until the kerosene 
supply is exhausted.93 This simple technology had been shown to extend the range of a pilot 
balloon ten times to over 1,000 miles. Millikan’s proposal was to apply this technology to a fleet 
of pilot balloons equipped with various auto-recording meteorological instruments that could be 
released in the United States or from boats in the Atlantic, travel across the Atlantic at 
predetermined altitudes, and finally land in Europe before being collected.94  
This truly ambitious proposal, to be carried out with the Meteorological Service’s 
equipment and personnel, would require an increase in government funding to pay for the huge 
numbers of balloons, meteorological instruments, and technicians needed to sustain this constant 
stream of trans-Atlantic sounding balloons. Millikan’s idea also relied on an assumption of 
continuously cooperative diplomatic relations between the United States and wherever the pilot 
balloons finally landed or else no data could be received. The endeavor also could not rapidly 
gather and report the data collected which made this data of little value for forecasting. Despite 
these criticisms, both articles show that the Meteorological Service had contributed to the greater 
knowledge of the workings of the upper atmosphere and that the Service was not an entirely 
irrelevant organization in peacetime.  
 Millikan had already left the Meteorological Service at the time of his article’s 
publication and, by 1922, his proposal had gone unheard and was forgotten. In the meantime, the 
Meteorological Service had continued to expand—totaling twenty-seven active stations—
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without receiving an accompanying increase in budget or personnel.95 This increase in total 
stations was in part to support the “model airway” experiment. “Model airways” were designed 
to help pilots fly regularly between major destinations along aerial routes that were well marked 
with ground-markers, lights, and a radio beam. The Meteorological Service supported these 
highways by providing local forecasts and emergency storm and fog warnings to aviators before 
and during their flight (via wireless radio).96 Here, the usefulness of the Meteorological Service 
was affirmed while, at the same time, the Service’s severe shortages in manpower and funding 
were increased.  The majority of the further expansions in the number of the Meteorological 
Service’s stations and, in 1928, a token increase in enlisted meteorological personnel were made 
for the benefit of the growing Air Corps (formerly the Air Service) and its own increasing 
responsibilities.97 This reflects the overall theme of the previous two articles, that is, that the 
work of the Meteorological Service was becoming increasingly relevant to military and 
commercial aviation during peacetime as a source of regular condition forecasts. It also shows 
that the Meteorological Service was gradually becoming exclusively associated with the Air 
Corps. 
 
Failures, Shortcomings, and Dissolution  
By the 1930s, the Meteorological Service’s struggle to provide support on an inadequate 
budget and manpower allotment was worsening and the quality of the support rendered was 
decreasing. The public was alerted to this struggle (and the animosity between the Air Corps and 
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the “old-guard” of the General Staff) after the fiasco of 1934 when President Franklin Roosevelt 
ordered the Air Corps to temporarily fly the air mail while new private contracts could be 
negotiated. Since these flights would need meteorological support, the Meteorological Service 
was also mobilized to aid the Air Corps. According to an Air Force study compiled about a 
decade later, only 2,028 out of 3,140 (65.8%) scheduled air mail flights were completed by the 
Air Service—dismal performance largely the result of poor weather forecasts provided by the 
Meteorological Service.98 This debacle occurred after both the Meteorological Service and the 
Air Corps had been struggling for more than a decade to secure more resources and respect from 
the General Staff and set off the debate to solve the problems of these two disparaging branches 
of the armed forces.  
There were a range of solutions proposed for the interrelated problems of the 
Meteorological Service and Air Corps. The Air Corps’ primary demand was to become an 
independent branch of the military while the Signal Corps wished to either drastically reorganize 
and reinforce the Meteorological Service or simply be removed from the responsibility of 
administering it. After three years of investigations, debates, and bickering, it was suggested 
that—as the primary user of meteorological support—the Air Corps should take over the 
provision of its own meteorological service and that the Signal Corps Meteorological Service 
should be disbanded.99 On July 1, 1937, the assets and personnel of the Meteorological Service 
were transferred to the Air Corps and the Signal Corps officially “went out of the weather 
business” once again.100 
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 The empirical practices of meteorology were mobilized by the U.S. armed forces in 1917 
to provide support mainly (but not exclusively) for aerial, chemical, and artillery operations. 
Support was given by the Signal Corps Meteorological Service mostly in the form of forecasts 
and reports on current local weather conditions. Given the urgency of mobilization in 1917, the 
formation and deployment of the Meteorological Service was a hurried and complicated affair. 
The stress of the task to provide the best possible results as fast as possible drove innovation 
within the Service. For instance, the Meteorological Service improved the pilot balloon upper-air 
sounding process by researching balloon ascent rates and compiling standard ascent tables from 
the results to eliminate the need for two theodolites and a surveyed baseline. Improvements and 
standardizations in meteorological practice—necessitated by the practice’s military application 
during the First World War—helped solidify meteorology’s role in the military as an aid to new 
technologies as well as general wartime operations. The fact that the Meteorological Service was 
not demilitarized or disbanded in 1918 and 1937 when its continuation came into question is a 
sign of this solidification. 
 These developments in meteorological practice also highlighted its foundational limits in 
the accuracy, scalability, and mobility of its applications. Professional meteorologists in America 
as well as Great Britain and elsewhere had recognized these limits before the strain of total war 
emphasized them further. What had changed by the end of the First World War was the 
increased demand coming from the military for more accurate forecasts and other meteorological 
work. The empirical forecasting methods of the nineteenth century were no longer “good 
enough” for the primary users of meteorological services. By the Second World War, these limits 






aided by new data gathering instruments and increased funding gained prominence in the 
academic research environment.  
 Lacking its well-publicized role in dramatic events like D-Day, meteorology in the First 
World War is often overshadowed by its application in the Second World War. This trend is 
reflected in most modern scholarship on the history of meteorology. Often, this scholarship falls 
short of emphasizing the extent to which meteorological practice was integrated into the military 
and the functioning of its technologies and weapon systems. I see this wide integration as a 
potential unifying theme to a larger survey work on the First World War that touches on other 
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